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A LOOK AT CIVIL GIDEON: IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL IN CERTAIN CIVIL CASES? 
Justice Jess H. Dickinson* 
When our Founders signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776, 
America was born, but it was not perfect. We immediately went to war with 
Great Britain—a war that was to last seven years. 
In 1783, the war ended, and we had won our independence, but still, 
we were not perfect. We needed a constitution, which our Framers produced 
after six years of heated debate. On April 30, 1789, George Washington was 
inaugurated as our first president, and on February 2, 1790, the United 
States Supreme Court held its first session, marking the date the United 
States government first became fully operational. 
Still, America was not perfect. Slavery was legal. Women could not 
vote. The accused had no right to counsel. There was no freedom of speech, 
no freedom of the press, and no freedom of religion. Our citizens had no 
protection from the government against unreasonable search and seizure. To 
say the least, we had many unaddressed problems. 
Almost two years after our government began to operate with all three 
branches, the States ratified the Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to 
the Constitution—and we moved a little closer to perfection. Those ten 
amendments provided substantial federal rights and protections to our citi-
zens from the federal government; but what about the states? The individual 
states were left with the power to enact state laws and policies that discrimi-
nated, abused, and unfairly treated the citizens. 
For the next three-quarters of a century, we engaged in a great struggle 
for freedom and civil rights that erupted into a great civil war that lasted 
four years, ending in 1865 with more than 750,000 deaths. Then, three years 
after that war ended—on July 9, 1868—a great event took place, one we all 
should remember and celebrate. Secretary of State William H. Seward certi-
fied the Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution. 
Finally, we had real equal protection under the law and the constitu-
tional right to due process of law! Or did we? While it is true that only two 
years later we ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting denial of the 
right to vote based on race, it would be fifty-two more years before we 
would ratify the Nineteenth Amendment, prohibiting laws that denied wom-
en the right to vote. And Secretary Seward would have to wait another 
eighty-six years for Brown v. Board of Education to end legalized school 
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segregation,1 and eighty-nine years before Congress passed the Civil Rights 
Act of 1957. 
Of course, there have been many other struggles where brave women 
and men have stood on front lines of battle and fought for their beliefs. The-
se struggles for civil rights and civil justice have been ongoing now almost a 
hundred and fifty years since we say we granted every citizen the constitu-
tional right to equal protection and due process. And while it is true that we 
have seen many successes, few of them have been easy. 
It is against that backdrop of history that I would like to tell you a sto-
ry—a true story—about a criminal case.2 I know we are here about access to 
justice in civil cases, but please bear with me. I think this story can teach us 
something of great importance. 
Young Clarence was not a good student. He dropped out of school and 
ran away. For years he was a drifter doing odd jobs to survive. In June 1961, 
Clarence found himself in Panama City, Florida where he had managed to 
amass a few hundred dollars which, like most drifters, he kept in his pock-
ets. 
During the early morning hours of June 3, Clarence left his small hotel 
room and walked across the street to a pay phone to call a cab to take him to 
a local restaurant to get his breakfast. As he sat eating his breakfast, the po-
lice came in and arrested him, charging him with robbing the vending ma-
chines in the local pool hall. An eye-witness had identified Clarence as the 
robber, and much of the money the police found in Clarence’s pockets was 
change. Police were not impressed with Clarence’s claim that he had won 
the nickels, dimes, and quarters in a poker game the night before. 
Now of course you could not hire much of an attorney in a criminal 
case for $300—even in 1961—so on the morning of his trial, Clarence asked 
Circuit Judge Robert McCrary, Jr. to appoint him a lawyer. Judge McCrary 
said he was sorry, but under the laws of the State of Florida, Clarence was 
not entitled to a lawyer unless he was charged with a capital offense. 
Judge McCrary seemed sympathetic to Clarence’s plight, but he was 
bound by the law which had been set decades before by the United States 
Supreme Court in Betts v. Brady, which held that the right to counsel was 
limited to capital cases and cases where the defendant demonstrated “special 
circumstances” such as illiteracy.3 Clarence’s case was not a capital case; he 
was not illiterate, and he did not qualify for any of the other “special cir-
cumstances.” His only argument was that he was poor, so he proceeded to 
trial, acting as his own lawyer. And to no one’s surprise, he was convicted. 
 
 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 2. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 3. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). 
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Clarence never ceased claiming he was innocent. When he arrived at 
the Florida State Prison, he doggedly used the prison library to read every-
thing he could find about the Fourteenth Amendment. It did not matter to 
him what Judge McCrary, the prosecutors, or anyone else said. It did not 
even matter to him what the Justices of the United States Supreme Court had 
said in the Betts case. Clarence knew what he believed, and in his own 
crude, succinct words, this is what he believed: “They can’t give you a fair 
trial without they give you a lawyer.” 
And so he sat there at a little wooden desk in the prison library with a 
legal pad, a pencil, and prison books, and he worked out a crude legal argu-
ment—not born of precedent or scholarly articles penned by lawyers—but 
one of common sense and a stubborn, uncompromising view of what was 
right. 
I sometimes think how discouraged Clarence must have become at 
times, with all the judges saying “it’s not the law;” all the lawyers and legal 
scholars saying “it’s not going to be the law;” and even those who wanted 
him to win saying “you don’t have a chance.” But still, he continued to read 
and scratch out his argument that “they can’t give you a fair trial without 
they give you a lawyer.” And when he was finished, he tore the pages from 
the legal pad and mailed them to the United States Supreme Court, asking 
the justices to recognize and announce to the world that the United States 
Constitution guaranteed him and other indigent criminal defendants the 
right—the constitutional right—to be represented by an attorney. 
A law clerk in the Chief Justice’s chambers read Clarence’s petition 
and recommended to the Chief Justice that the Court review the case. And, 
at its next en banc conference, the Court voted to do just that, and it appoint-
ed Abe Fortas to represent him for the appeal. 
Abraham “Abe” Fortas was a brilliant lawyer and an excellent choice. 
He had taught law at Yale University where, as a student, he had served as 
Editor-in-Chief of the Yale Law Journal and had graduated second in his 
class. In private practice, he and Thurmond Arnold founded Arnold and 
Fortas, which later (after Fortas’s appointment to the United States Supreme 
Court) became Arnold and Porter, one of the world’s largest and most pres-
tigious law firms. 
My friend, Jim Sandman—the current president of the Legal Services 
Corporation (“LSC”)—was an attorney at Arnold and Porter. Jim recently 
gave me a copy of Clarence’s handwritten petition to the Court. I had it 
framed, and it now hangs in the moot courtroom at the Mississippi College 
School of Law, where I am an adjunct professor of evidence and trial prac-
tice. 
During the oral argument of Clarence’s case, Mr. Fortas told the Court: 
“there has been a tendency from time to time . . . to forget the realities . . . of 
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what happens to these poor, miserable, indigent people . . . in these strange 
and awesome circumstances.”4 He said: 
I was reminded the other night as I was pondering this case about Clar-
ence Darrow’s trial . . . [when he was] accused and subsequently acquit-
ted of attempting to bribe jurors. . . . [T]he first thing Clarence Darrow 
realized was that he had to have a lawyer. Here was a man who . . . I 




In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court overruled Betts, over-
turned Clarence’s conviction, and sent the case back to the Florida court for 
a new trial.6 Clarence, of course, was Clarence Earl Gideon, the defendant in 
the landmark case, Gideon v. Wainright, in which the Supreme Court recog-
nized that Clarence’s right to counsel was a fundamental, constitutional 
right.7 In the majority opinion, Justice Hugo Black pointed out that lawyers 
are necessities, not luxuries.8 He went on to say: 
reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system 
of criminal justice, any person hailed into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided.
9
 
My reason for using Clarence’s story is illustrated by a quote that was 
placed on his headstone in 1984 by the American Civil Liberties Union. The 
quote was taken from the last paragraph of a letter Clarence wrote to Mr. 
Fortas in November 1962. It says: “I believe that each era finds an im-
provement in law for the benefit of mankind.” 
All of us should be seeking an improvement in the law that will benefit 
mankind. We passionately believe in what we do. But what do we really 
believe about what we do? Do we believe that legal aid lawyers are just a 
good idea? Many think what we do equates to charity work, like soup kitch-
ens, animal shelters, and the Red Cross, all of which, of course, are im-
portant, but none of which raise constitutional questions. So the question is, 
do we believe fair and equal justice in our courts is simply a good, important 
idea, or does that concept have constitutional implications, making it a prior-
ity in the great scheme of government? 
It is the government’s job to make sure constitutional rights are pro-
tected. I know there are serious problems with the federal budget. Many of 
 
 4. Oral Argument at 20:18, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 155), 
available at https://www.oyez.org/cases/1962/155. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. 
 7. See id. at 344–45. 
 8.   Id. at 344. 
 9. Id. 
2015] A LOOK AT CIVIL GIDEON 547 
my friends say “don’t push it too fast, we can’t risk losing everything.” They 
feel the right way to go is to continue trying to persuade Congress and our 
state legislatures to appropriate a little more each year—never mind that we 
are going backwards—rather than challenging them to live up to their con-
stitutional responsibilities. 
Those views, I know, are expressed in good faith by good people who 
legitimately want to advance the cause of equal justice for the poor. But 
when I think of our cause and the effectiveness of delay, I think of the one 
hundred men and women at the Seneca Convention in 1848, who signed the 
Declaration of Sentiments, demanding women be given the right to vote. 
That was seventy-two years before we ratified the Nineteenth Amendment. 
I think of Susan B. Anthony, who was arrested for voting in 1872. She 
said to the judge: “You have trampled under foot every vital principle of our 
government. My natural rights, my civil rights, my political rights, my judi-
cial rights, are all alike ignored.”10 
I think of the March on Selma. I think of Oliver Brown’s third-grade 
daughter, Linda, who was forced to walk past a white elementary school to 
attend a segregated school in Topeka, Kansas. I think of the “Little Rock 
Nine”—those nine brave high school students who walked into Central High 
School right here in Little Rock in 1957. I think of all of these, and so many 
more. I thank God they believed, they stood up, and they cried out for jus-
tice, even in the face of all of those who told them they could not win. 
My friends, we are on the front lines of this battle. If we do not believe, 
no one will. If we do not stand up, no one will. If we do not cry out, no one 
will. I know what I believe. I believe that when one person uses the law, the 
government, its facilities, and its power in an attempt to take away an indi-
gent person’s life, liberty, or property—which includes children, shelter, 
livelihood, and the basic right to dignity—that indigent person is constitu-
tionally entitled to have a lawyer appointed, just as they are in a criminal 
case. My beliefs may not be in the majority, but I do not think I stand alone. 
Last year, during the LSC’s 50th anniversary celebration in Washing-
ton, D.C., I had the privilege of serving on a symposium panel with other 
state Supreme Court justices from around the country. And by the way, my 
bluegrass band—The Bluegrass Appeal—played for one of the receptions, 
and I still have some CDs for sale. The fiddler in the band likes to say that 
our CD—“From Dublin to the Delta”—is a million seller because we still 
have a million of them boxed up, down in the cellar. 
But during that symposium, almost every one of the justices made 
statements that indicated they think maybe the time has come for this coun-
 
 10. Susan B. Anthony, THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON & SUSAN B. 
ANTHONY: AGAINST AN ARISTOCRACY OF SEX, 1866 TO 1873, 613 (Ann D. Gordon et al. eds., 
2000). 
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try to seriously consider whether there is a basic, constitutional right to be 
represented by counsel in certain civil cases. Some call it Civil Gideon, and 
as I stated at that symposium, I do believe its time has come. 
During the LSC’s birthday celebration, one of the keynote speakers 
was Justice Antonin Scalia. During his speech, he complemented the LSC 
and its work, and I remember thinking what a gracious gesture from a mem-
ber of the Supreme Court. But then he said something that I thought was so 
profound and important that I wrote it down on a napkin. He told us that the 
right to counsel is one of our most fundamental rights as Americans. 
I had the pleasure of sitting next to Justice Scalia during lunch that day. 
During our conversation, I referred to his statement and asked him: “if the 
right to counsel is a fundamental right, wouldn’t that make it a constitutional 
right?” He did not say yes, but he did not say no either. He said, “That’s an 
interesting question.” It certainly is. 
And so, that brings it back to us. I would like to read you what Attor-
ney General Robert Kennedy said about Clarence Earl Gideon: 
If an obscure Florida convict named Clarence Earl Gideon had not sat 
down in his prison cell with a pencil and paper to write a letter to the Su-
preme Court, and if the court had not taken the trouble to look for merit 
in that one crude petition, among all the bundles of mail it must receive 
every day, the vast machinery of American law would have gone on 
functioning undisturbed. But Gideon did write that letter, the court did 
look into his case; he was retried with the help of a competent defense 
counsel, found not guilty and released from prison after two years of 
punishment for a crime he did not commit—And the whole course of 
American legal history has been changed.
11
 
Are we going to wait for another Clarence Earl Gideon to come along 
to make the argument we should be making? As I already have said, I know 
that many disagree with me—even some of my good friends who have been 
working for this cause much longer than I have. And to them, I say that I 
know this is not an easy issue. I know it is an uphill climb. I know the odds 
are against us. But the great tragedy is not to fail; it is to fail because we did 
not even try. 
I close by reminding you of something I said the last time I stood be-
fore you in this very room. We revere our Constitution as our country’s 
heart. It is the supreme law, and its words and phrases tell us who we are. 
The preamble’s purpose is to announce to the world why we fought a war to 
 
 11. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States, Address at the New 
England Conference on the Defense of Indigent Persons Accused of Crime (Nov. 1, 1963) 
(emphasis added), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/11-01-196
3Pro.pdf. 
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win independence and to set out in plain view our Constitution’s five pur-
poses. And the second of those five purposes is to “establish Justice.”12 
My friends, when justice is for sale, when the poor do not stand equal 
to the rich in our courts, when poor people by the millions go unrepresented 
in court—losing their children, their homes, their property, and sometimes 
their very freedom—we have not established justice. And we will not estab-
lish justice so long as we as a country grossly underfund legal services for 
the poor—leaving millions and millions of Americans with no reasonable 
chance at fairness and justice in our courts. 
So in case you have not gotten the message, I believe that equal access 
to justice—and to our courts—is a constitutional right; and I believe its time 
has come. And like all constitutional rights, I believe it is worth fighting for. 
 
 12. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
